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I. INTRODUCTION
Socioeconomics sheds important light on lawyers’ professional
responsibilities of competence and candor regarding law-related
economic issues. It also sheds light on the duty to facilitate client
understanding of the legal process and the duty to improve the law both
for clients and for the good of society. In addition, an introduction to
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socioeconomics will empower students by giving them a sounder basis
for understanding the ethical responsibilities of their teachers when
they teach law-related economic issues.
An understanding of
socioeconomics and its relation to law can also enrich students’
understanding of professional responsibility and its importance
throughout the curriculum.
In an earlier article regarding the role socioeconomics plays in the
practice of law, I advanced the following thesis: The requirements of
competence and candor and the duty to improve the law, as set forth in
the rules and codes of professional responsibility, call for lawyers to take
a socioeconomic approach when considering economic issues.1 As
summarized in Part II below, this thesis is based on (1) the essential role
of the lawyer in helping people to identify and secure their rights and
obligations, (2) the professional responsibilities related to competence,
candor, and the duty to improve the law, and (3) a definition of
socioeconomics set forth in a petition signed by over 120 law professors
from over fifty American law schools to establish the Section on SocioEconomics of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).2 This
Article extends this thesis to law teaching; lest they teach by bad
example, law teachers should also take a socioeconomic approach to
law-related economic issues.
Part II of this Article provides a summary of the foregoing thesis and
discusses the lawyer’s ethical duties of competence and candor, and the
duties to improve the law and assist clients in gaining competence
regarding law-related economic issues. Part III discusses some positive
and normative deficiencies of the neoclassical approach to teaching law
and economics. Part IV discusses the need for a socioeconomic approach to
law and economics. Finally, Part V provides a brief conclusion.
II. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE CALL TO TAKE A
SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW-RELATED
ECONOMIC ISSUES
A. Introduction
The thesis that the rules and codes of professional responsibility call
1. Robert Ashford, Socio-Economics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 611, 622–23.
2. The definition of socioeconomics is set forth and discussed in Robert Ashford,
What Is Socioeconomics?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 5 (2004).
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for lawyers and law teachers to take a socioeconomic approach when
considering economic issues can be summarized as follows: (1)
Competence and candor call upon lawyers (a) to look at the client as a
whole person in full context (unless the representation is explicitly
limited), (b) to distinguish between facts and values, (c) to distinguish
between the important and the less important, (d) to understand the
significance of evidence in context, (e) to understand the weaknesses (as
well as the strengths) in the positions supporting the interests of clients
and adversaries, and (f) to offer as an essential part of the representation
moral and other considerations beyond those of a purely economic
dimension,3 (2) lawyers have an affirmative duty to assist clients in
understanding their essential rights, responsibilities, opportunities, risks,
and uncertainties under the law, and to improve the law, not only for the
benefit of clients, but also for the benefit of society,4 (3) socioeconomics
is an approach to economics that (a) is grounded in the scientific method,
(b) is informed by classical, neoclassical, Keynesian, institutional,
binary, and other approaches relevant to economic understanding, (c) yet
accepts none of these as the absolute starting point for determining
economic reality, (d) but rather, starting with the scientific method, draws
from all disciplines as relevant when analyzing law-related economic
issues in particular contexts, and (e) is both value- and paradigm-conscious;5
therefore, to understand and communicate economic considerations, the
rules of professional responsibility call for lawyers and law teachers to
take a socioeconomic approach to law-related economic issues.6 If
valid, this proposition should inform professional responsibilities related
to law practice and teaching in any context in which economic issues
have substantial legal significance.
The call for a socioeconomic approach is admittedly aspirational. No
one will be disciplined for not approaching law-related issues from a
socioeconomic perspective. Professors’ academic freedom should not be
threatened if they insist on an exclusively neoclassical approach to lawrelated economic issues. Aspirational professional responsibilities are a
matter of conscience. Nevertheless, because it is in harmony with good
lawyering, once it is understood in context, the call for a socioeconomic
approach may have the effect of changing the way law-related economic
issues are taught. The sections that follow discuss in greater detail specific
professional responsibilities regarding law-related economic issues.
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 2.1, 3.3 (2001); MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (2002).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 5; id. R. 6.1(a)(3); MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25.
5. See Ashford, supra note 2, at 7.
6. This thesis is set forth in greater detail in Ashford, supra note 1, at 611.
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B. Competence Regarding Law-Related Economic Issues
Competence generally requires lawyers to understand the applicability
of laws, rules, precedents, and policies in context. The idea that
competence calls for a socioeconomic foundation for addressing economic
issues stems from the recognition that, compared to the socioeconomic
approach, the neoclassical economic approach that presently serves as
the foundation for mainstream law and economics provides only a small
part of the analysis necessary to understand law-related economic issues
in context. According to The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, a
widely accepted economic authority, “a large volume of work . . .
suggests that [the neoclassical assumption of] perfect competition
corresponds to an extremely special, limiting case of a more general
theory of markets” and that “no important market fully satisfies the
conditions of perfect competition and that most would not appear even to
come close.”7 Furthermore, “the received theory of perfect competition is a
theory of price competition that contains no coherent explanation of
price formation. That such a fundamental incompleteness does not
severely limit the value of the theory is striking.”8
Discussing the neoclassical foundation of economic theory, economist
Robert Solo has eloquently stated the following:
The [neoclassical] economics paradigm traces an isle of the solvable in a sea
of the inexplicable. It cannot account for, explain or predict a host of economic
phenomena and events. With its assumption of rational, self seeking individualized
choice it leaves out of account the economic consequences of variations in
attitude, value, culture and ideology, or variation in the institutional context of
choice, or class struggle and collective behavior. . . .
In some instances theories, even whole schools of thought have developed
outside the paradigm to explain the effects on economic phenomena and events
of these excluded variables. Thus the Institutionalist School of John R.
Commons brings into account the effects of the law as the context of transaction
in the determination of economic event.9

Indeed, since the foundational work of John R. Commons,10 inadequacies
of neoclassical economics have led to the emergence of a wide array of
approaches within economics and beyond, including Austrian, behavioral,
binary, ecological, feminist, humanistic, institutional, Keynesian, post7. 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 837–38 (John Eatwell et
al. eds., 1987).
8. Id. (quoting the entry, “perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets”).
9. ROBERT A. SOLO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS 42 (1991).
10. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1968).
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Keynesian, and social economics. More recently, an approach consistent
with socioeconomics called contextual economics has been advanced by
thoughtful economists.11 All of these approaches dispute, on positive, factual
grounds, primary or exclusive reliance on the neoclassical paradigm as
the foundation for addressing economic issues. Moreover, most of these
broader approaches within economics increasingly have found it necessary
to draw upon other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, political
science, anthropology, philosophy, history, and law, to describe, analyze,
and predict economic phenomena and to address economic issues.
Likewise, increasingly in recent years, reformers of mainstream law and
economics have broadened their approach to include some of the
methodologies and perspectives from these disparate approaches, but the
neoclassical approach generally remains as the foundational starting
point of their analysis.
No doubt some proponents of the neoclassical approach to law and
economics will take some comfort in the continuation in the New
Palgrave entry, which reads as follows:
In the competition between economic [market] models, the theory of perfect
competition holds a dominant market share: no set of ideas is so widely and
successfully used by economists as is the logic of perfectly competitive
markets. . . . [A]ll other market models . . . are little more than fringe competitors.12

The entry concludes that the dominance of perfect competition theory
is not the result of its strength, but rather “a reflection of the weakness of
imperfectly competitive analysis. There is in fact no powerful general
theory of imperfect competition.”13 However satisfying this may be to
some economists and law teachers, it is hardly a ringing endorsement for
an economic paradigm from the perspective of lawyers who take
seriously the professional responsibility to get facts right or from the
perspective of practitioners of any discipline that respects the scientific
method.
In fact, every one of the assumptions underlying the neoclassical
paradigm can be brought into question. Indeed, there is evidence that (1)
people do not behave rationally according to the definitions of rational

Id.

11. NEVA GOODWIN ET AL., MICROECONOMICS IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2004).
Economics is the study of the kinds of social organization by which people
provide for the sustaining of life, and enhance the quality of life. The four
essential economic activities are resource maintenance and the production,
distribution and consumption of goods and services. Economists study how
these activities are undertaken by individuals, and how their social coordination is
achieved.

12.
837.
13.
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behavior extant in neoclassical economics (specifically the axioms of
revealed preference as laid out by Paul Samuelson),14 (2) people do not
act only with self-interest, (3) income distribution is not in accordance
with the marginal productivity theory of income distribution under
conditions of perfect competition, (4) preferences are not entirely
exogenous, (5) race, sex, and nature cannot be ignored or encapsulated
within the market, and (6) the best starting point for economic analysis is
not one that considers essentially or nearly factually accurate the
existence of perfect competition because the conditions necessary for
perfect competition, including no barriers to market entry, perfect
knowledge, zero transactions costs, no problems with externalities, and
other conditions necessary for perfect neoclassical efficiency are not
satisfied in any important market in any major economy.15
14. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 90–92 (enlarged
ed. 1983).
15. In what Paul Samuelson dubbed “the F-twist,” Milton Friedman has dismissed
the objections to the unreality of the assumptions of neoclassical economics by arguing
that
the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether
they are descriptively of “realistic,” for they never are, but whether they are
sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question
can be answered by seeing whether the theory . . . yields sufficiently accurate
predictions.
Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3 (1953), reprinted in APPRAISAL AND CRITICISM IN ECONOMICS: A BOOK OF
READINGS 138, 150 (Bruce J. Caldwell ed., 1984). However, Friedman’s defense of the
unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical economics (which is known as instrumentalism)
is itself very controversial among economists. First, on the issue of predictive power,
many economists, such as Robert Solo and Steve Keen, conclude that neoclassical
economics is a poor predictor of actual events. Moreover, economists and philosophers
have noted that Friedman’s instrumentalism confuses negligibility assumptions (which
may conflict with reality without undermining the applicability of a theory) and domain
assumptions (which may not). See, e.g., Alan Musgrave, “Unreal Assumptions” in
Economic Theory: The F-Twist Untwisted, 34 KYKLOS: INT’L REV. FOR SOC. SCI. 377
(1981), reprinted in APPRAISAL AND CRITICISM IN ECONOMICS: A BOOK OF READINGS,
supra, at 234, 235–39. Professor Musgrave explains that there are three kinds of
assumptions: (1) negligibility assumptions, such as the assumption that in predicting the
fall of a ball bearing to earth, the air resistance can be assumed to be negligible; (2)
domain assumptions, which specify the conditions under which a theory will apply—if
those conditions do not apply, then neither does the theory; and (3) heuristic
assumptions, which are known to be false but which are made to simplify the analysis as
a first step to a more general theory, and later abandoned when the more general theory
is fully formulated. Id. According to Drs. Musgrave and Keen, the assumptions
underlying neoclassical economics are domain assumptions, which means that because
the assumptions contradict reality, the domain of applicability of neoclassical economics
is “nowhere.” STEVE KEEN, DEBUNKING ECONOMICS: THE NAKED EMPEROR OF THE
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Thus economists are sharply divided as to whether it is sound in many
contexts to begin with a foundation grounded in assumptions of perfect
efficiency, and many economists believe that it is misleading to do so.16
Neoclassical economics competes not only with market models of imperfect
competition but also with other approaches to economic phenomena that
include (in addition to markets) other institutions and disciplines,
command structures, values, and a richer understanding of human beings.17
In an excellent article, Institutional Law and Economics, economist A.
Allan Schmid exposes many of the positive deficiencies of law and
neoclassical economics and offers a positive alternative institutional law
and economic approach that has historical roots in the work of John R.
Commons.18 Many other economists share similar views.19 Some of the
troublesome inadequacies of limiting law and economics to the
neoclassical approach will be explored further in Part III.
Competence requires lawyers to begin with the right foundational
starting point. Because economics is divided on the efficacy of the
neoclassical paradigm, law and economic analysis must start with a
foundation that is respectful of that diversity of opinion. In law, the
competent application of a particular approach in context requires a
proper foundation for doing so; one on which the weaknesses and
limitations in the approach can be evaluated and on which other relevant
ways of looking at the issues at hand can also be considered. Thus, legal
competence regarding law-related economic issues does not require a
rejection of the neoclassical paradigm. Rather, competence requires
lawyers to begin their analysis with a foundation that (1) recognizes that
the applicability and probity of the neoclassical approach depends on
SOCIAL SCIENCES 149–64 (2001).
16. Peter Monaghan, Taking on “Rational Man,” CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 24,
2003, at A12. Speaking of “neoclassical economics, which is based on such concepts as
rational choice, the market, and economies’ tendency to move toward equilibrium,” Mr.
Monaghan writes: “Despite the power of the orthodoxy, the naysayers are numerous.
While the American Economic Association has some 22,000 members, the 30-odd
groups under the umbrella of the International Confederation of Associations for
Pluralism in Economics have American memberships totaling more than 5,000.” Id.
17. See generally ROBERT A. SOLO, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL
SYSTEMS (Univ. of Mich. Press 2000) (1967) (proposing a change of the neoclassical
economic paradigm through an examination of several different forms of economic
organization, the national economy, as well as social systems and economic
development). This book, which is endorsed by Richard Hattwick, the founding editor
of the Journal of Socio-Economics, as the best text by an economist on the essence of
socioeconomics, was republished by the University of Michigan Press in part because of
the growing interest in socioeconomics among law teachers.
18. A. Allan Schmid, Institutional Law and Economics, 1 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 33
(1994).
19. For example, Paul Davidson, Matthew Forstater, Warren Samuels, Robert
Solo, Harry Trebing, Charles Whalen, Randall Wray, and Edward Wolff.
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context, (2) takes into account its weaknesses and limitations, and (3) is
also receptive in an even-handed manner to other approaches that
explain phenomena in different ways. In some contexts, microeconomic
principles may tell the whole story of socioeconomic effect; in other
contexts other schools of economics, other disciplines, and even whole
new ways of thinking may be required. For these reasons, and for the
additional reasons set forth below, competence requires socioeconomics
rather than neoclassical economics as the foundational starting point for
analyzing law-related economic issues in context.20
C. Candor Regarding Law-Related Economic Issues
The duty of candor regarding economic issues is not more lax than the
duty applied to other issues. In the course of legal representation,
attorneys may not knowingly make false statements of material fact or
law to courts and others. In the absence of limitations on disclosure
arising from considerations such as client confidences, attorney work
product, and constitutional rights, when an attorney speaks or writes,
knowing omissions that are materially misleading are no more excusable
than lies. In the course of teaching law, no looser standard should be
applied to law teachers. The duty of candor in teaching might be called
the duty to teach with full disclosure. Although applicable in a different
context, the spirit of the ethic of teaching with full disclosure is revealed
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct at rules 3.3(a)(1) and (3),
3.3(d), and 4.121 and in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
at DR 7-102 and DR 7-106(B)(2).22 When appearing before a judge in
20. An excellent book presenting many of the strengths and weaknesses of
neoclassical economics in context is KEEN, supra note 15.
21. Model Rule 3.3(a) provides in part, “A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a
false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal” and “(3) fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.” MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2001). Model Rule 3.3(d) provides, “In an ex parte
proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer
which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are
adverse.” Id. R. 3.3(d) (emphasis added). Model Rule 4.1 provides in part, “In the
course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement
of material fact or law to a third person . . . .” Id. R. 4.1.
22. Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102 provides in part, “(A) In his representation of
a client, a lawyer shall not . . . (5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.”
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (2002). Model Code Disciplinary
Rule 7-106 (B)(2) provides in part, “In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall
disclose: (1) [l]egal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be directly

141

ASHFORD TWO.DOC

9/17/2019 4:15 PM

an Illinois court, for example, if a lawyer represents that the case law of
California holds A, knowing in fact that the California appellate courts
are divided on the issue, with one holding A, another holding B, and a
third holding not-A, while knowing that there is no holding from the
California Supreme Court that resolves the conflict in opinions, that
lawyer has committed an ethical violation.
To represent to students that neoclassical economics speaks for all of
economics raises analogous ethical considerations. Whether the advancement
of a particular economic paradigm that rests on undisclosed controversy
materially relevant to law is considered, the advancement of facts (or
rather rules for determining facts), the need for full disclosure to students
(who generally have minimal training in economics and factfinding and
who entrust their attention in reliance of basic fair play in the teaching
process) is at least as strong as the need to protect judges (who are welltrained in the law and factfinding) from misstatements or inadequate
disclosure regarding the facts and law. Moreover, without one or more
other teachers in the classroom to represent alternative relevant points of
view, the ethical requirements regarding disclosure should, by analogy,
be informed by rule 3.3(d) governing ex parte proceedings, under which
there is the obligation to advance all considerations relevant to the
deliberations and judgments that are to be made.23 Following the rise
and decline of the original law and economics movement that began
largely with the work of John R. Commons and flourished in American
law schools from the 1930s through the 1950s,24 the present-day socalled law and economics movement that emerged after the McCarthy
era (and that has since flourished with increasing prominence with
substantial funding from institutions with particular economic agendas)
can accurately be called law and neoclassical economics; but to refer to
it as law and economics is not substantively accurate.25 Charitably, to
pass off law and neoclassical economics for law and economics can be
called a misnomer and, less charitably, can be called deceptive labeling.
Neoclassical economics is not all there is to economics. A
adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel.” Id.
DR 7-106 (footnotes omitted).
23. Model Rule 3.3(d) provides, “In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to
make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (emphasis added).
24. See Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Schools of Thought in Law and
Economics: A Kuhnian Competition, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 65, 95 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995).
25. For what might be the first explicit recognition in scholarship of the fact that
what passes for law and economics is in reality law and neoclassical economics, see
James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW HIST. REV. 275, 275–77 (1997).
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comparison of basic texts used to teach economics in law schools and
economics departments proves that what passes for authoritative
positivism as a matter of economic theory in the basic texts of law and
economics does not pass muster as fact in the departments of
economics.26 Even with the substantial funding from institutions with
particular economic perspectives, it is not entirely clear that the
contemporary so-called law and economics movement would have
spread so rapidly and influenced the law school curriculum so
pervasively if it were required to be labeled “law and neoclassical
economics.” Nevertheless, students frequently are falsely taught that
neoclassical economics speaks authoritatively for all economics when it
does not. Moreover, even if correctly labeled “law and neoclassical
economics,” such courses generally fail to reveal to law students the
complexities, known to many economists, that deprive neoclassical
analysis of its supposed predictive power and its ability to guide legal
policy so as to achieve unambiguous, value-free wealth maximization.27
Thus, in a course in law and neoclassical economics it would seem
appropriate and balanced to teach only neoclassical principles (preferably
with the full disclosure of their limitations), but in a course in law and
economics, candor would seem to call for a broader approach that
reflects the full richness and diversity of analysis contained in the
discipline of economics.
D. The Duty to Improve the Law
The socioeconomic approach to the competence and candor
requirements of a lawyer’s professional responsibility has an important
bearing on the lawyer’s duty to improve the law. Lawyers have the
responsibility not only to represent clients with competence and candor
within the bounds of existing law, but also to discover ways to improve
the law, not only for the benefit of clients but also, beyond and apart
from client interests, for the benefit of society.28 This duty exists not
26. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003)
(using an efficiency ethic of neoclassical economic principles as the basis for the seminal
text on law and economics), with PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
ECONOMICS (13th ed. 1989) (presenting an introduction to economic theory that suggests
moving beyond the complacency of mainstream or neoclassical economics, which may
be dull and essentially incorrect).
27. See KEEN, supra note 15, at 10.
28. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 5; id. R. 6.1(a)(3); MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (2002).
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only with respect to the rules of professional responsibility, but in all
areas of law practice and in virtually all subjects taught in law school.
Fulfilling the duty to improve the law requires an understanding of how
law changes. It also requires a rigorous understanding of the intellectual
and institutional barriers and resistance to change. Law schools and
teachers play an important part in the process of reforming the law and
defending the status quo. The scholarship they produce is used both to
support law reform and to fortify resistance to law reform on behalf of
clients and others. In supporting changes in the law and resistance to
change, advocates use and advance theories and evidence related to
those theories. When doing their part to improve the law, practitioners
and teachers are ethically required to act responsibly regarding the
theories and evidence they advance. The barriers and resistance to
reform are frequently fortified by unexamined assumptions and logic of
accepted theories. This is certainly true in economics.29 If theories
exclusively or primarily based on neoclassical economics are incomplete
or inaccurate, and therefore misleading, they must be balanced, supplemented,
and even replaced if by reason of logic, empirical evidence, or other
appropriate standard they fail to provide the foundation needed for
understanding and promoting beneficial change.
E. Assisting Clients and Others to Gain Competence Regarding
Law-Related Economic Issues
If lawyers know or can reasonably be expected to learn to identify what
understanding their clients lack—understanding that might aid or hinder
their cause—lawyers have the duty to supply it to clients either
directly by instruction30 or indirectly by securing the expertise of others
to supply it.31 In this context, the relationship of the lawyer to the client
is very much like the relationship of the teacher to the student. If clients,
students, and others are to participate effectively in the process of law
reform, they need informed understanding. Some will benefit from a
fuller understanding of the theories, including economic and competing
29. JOHN MAYNARD
AND MONEY viii (1936). In

KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
the preface to his General Theory, Keynes writes the following:
“The ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are extremely simple and should be
obvious. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones,
which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our
minds.” Id.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.”).
31. Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 4 (“Where consultation with a professional in another field is
itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a
recommendation.”).
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theories, that shape the law. This understanding is necessary to preserve
client autonomy and to enhance individual participation in the
democratic process. The role of candor here helps to fulfill lawyers’
vital connection to the preservation of individual autonomy and the
maintenance of democratic participation in governmental processes.32
Depending on their understanding of (1) the real consequences of
legal action and proposed law reform, (2) the barriers to legal action and
reform, and (3) the true realm of other possibilities revealed by other
paradigms of understanding, people’s responses and demands will be
realistic or unrealistic, well- or ill-suited to their interests, and pursued
with comprehension or confusion. People’s interests in legal action and
their appetites for law reform depend on their understanding of the
system and the processes of change. An economic theory offered to shape
and justify the law and law reform will gain acceptance and win trust if
it provides a coherent explanation as to how individuals and their rights
and responsibilities fit into the entire picture. Understanding the entire
law and economic picture, and one’s (and everyone’s) place in it, requires
more than a neoclassical perspective, more than a broader economic
perspective generally recognized by university professors of economics,
and more than economics augmented by just one or two other
disciplines. It requires a socioeconomic approach.
III. POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE DEFICIENCIES OF PASSING OFF
NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS FOR ECONOMICS WHEN
TEACHING “LAW AND ECONOMICS”
A. Introduction
Teaching “the economic analysis of law” (commonly referred to as
law and economics) based exclusively, foundationally, or primarily on
principles of neoclassical economics gives rise to serious positive and
normative deficiencies. Some of these have been explored extensively
in legal and economic scholarship;33 several others have gone largely
32. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. & prelim. statement (2002).
33. Many of the deficiencies of law and neoclassical economics are discussed by
economist A. Allan Schmid, in Schmid, supra note18. Professor Schmid makes an
excellent case for a broader approach to law and economics under the name of
institutional law and economics. In the area of legal scholarship, consider the work of
Richard S. Markovits, A Constructive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of
the Concept of “The Effect of a Choice on Allocative (Economic) Efficiency”: Why the
Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All Law-and-Economics Welfare
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unnoticed. To put in context the positive and normative deficiencies of
approaching a course, course segment, or subject labeled “law and
economics” from a neoclassical rather than a socioeconomic perspective,
consider four individuals: Anne, Bruce, Daphne, and Clark. Anne is a partner
in a prestigious Wall Street law firm. Her clients consist of a diversified
portfolio of America’s three thousand largest creditworthy companies.
Bruce is a public interest lawyer who represents poor and working
people, some but not all of whom qualify for legal aid. Daphne is a
federal government attorney in an agency charged with promoting
national economic welfare. Clark is a law professor whose students will
eventually join Anne, Bruce, Daphne, and Clark as professional colleagues.
All four take seriously the ethical precepts discussed above, including
the duty to improve the law for the benefit of clients and society. None
earned degrees in economics, but all believe that the connection between
law and economics has an important bearing on serving clients, improving
the law, and educating lawyers. The question they are considering is the
following: What understanding should they derive from economics,
either by way of learning or by relying on experts, to guide them in their
professional activities?
Without an empirical study of the way law and economics is actually
taught in courses, course segments, and subject matter offered under that
name, this Part takes as a proxy Economic Analysis of Law by Judge
Richard A. Posner.34 Economic Analysis of Law is a book that has been
adopted by many law teachers to teach law and economics and has been
cited in much legal scholarship on the subject. Judge Posner advances a
promising rationale for a course labeled “law and economics,” but that is
essentially limited to law and neoclassical economics. According to Judge
Posner, an “efficiency ethic” based on neoclassical economic principles
is (1) descriptive of the common law, (2) useful to the understanding of
both (a) the law and (b) the economic effects of law, and (3) especially
helpful in maximizing the societal wealth of an economy if its laws are
structured according to neoclassical economic principles.35 If neoclassical
economic principles serve in this way in a specific course called law and
economics, then it is easy to perceive important benefits to be derived from
including neoclassical economic principles in other courses throughout the
curriculum, in scholarship, and in efforts to improve the law. According
to Judge Posner’s approach, so strong is the descriptive and wealthArguments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 485. For a scholarly, historical analysis of
the legal scholarship, see James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics
Theory: A Critical History of the Distribution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361
(2003).
34. POSNER, supra note 26.
35. Id. at 249–53.

146

ASHFORD TWO.DOC

[VOL. 41: 133, 2004]

9/17/2019 4:15 PM

Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

enhancing promise of neoclassical economics that it is offered as a
means of unifying disparate basic courses such as contracts, property,
torts, and criminal law and advanced law courses by reconceptualizing
them in terms of the neoclassical paradigm. However, it is doubtful that
this neoclassical reconceptualization can be accepted without changing
the substance of past decisions and the direction of future decisions.
Moreover, in a course on law and economics, if the neoclassical
approach to law and economics is selective, incomplete, and taught in
such a way as to exclude, obscure, and misrepresent positive law-related
economic phenomena that call into question the wealth-maximizing
promise of neoclassical economics, then the positive benefits promised
by the neoclassical approach, and the propriety of passing off the
neoclassical approach as the sole economic theory or as speaking for all
economics, are seriously drawn into question.36
It is also significant to note that, if accepted, Judge Posner’s approach
to law and economics has the effect of framing the analysis of many of
the issues and interests of clients and students regarding law-related
economic issues in a particular way. If the wealth-maximizing promise
of structuring the common law and other law on neoclassical principles
is accepted as the positive starting point for predicting and achieving
societal wealth maximization, then (according to Judge Posner) the goal
of “distributively neutral” wealth maximization can be contrasted with
and balanced against all other “competing values” of distribution and
justice. The debate is thus framed as wealth maximization versus
competing values.37
It is neither good lawyering nor good socioeconomics, however, to
accept this characterization without considering other positive arguments
that (1) are an essential part of contemporary economic understanding,
(2) draw into question the promised connection between microeconomic
efficiency and societal wealth maximization, (3) offer alternative positive
approaches to wealth maximization, and (4) reveal that Judge Posner’s
approach to law and economics is not distributively neutral.
According to the socioeconomic approach, if wealth maximization is a
36. This Article takes primary issue with the claim that structuring common law
decisions and other legal policy according to neoclassical principles is wealth-maximizing.
Whether such a strategy is actually descriptive of common law decisionmaking is left for
another day. Also left for another day are normative arguments against the efficiency
ethic, which are a frequent subject of legal scholarship.
37. POSNER, supra note 26, at 252.
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major goal of teaching law and economics, then as a positive matter of
economics, primary reliance on the neoclassical approach without a
foundation receptive to a broader understanding of economics and other
disciplines is a problematic approach resting on a dubious foundation.
Passing off law and neoclassical economics as law and economics
ignores important positive controversies in economics and other relevant
disciplines regarding (1) the application of neoclassical economic theory
in context, (2) the macroeconomic effect of legal policy based on neoclassical
theory, and (3) the macroeconomic operation of the economy.38
Although Judge Posner assures students that the promised connection
between efficiency and growth (wealth maximization) is “rather
38. Exclusive or primary reliance on neoclassical economics in law schools and to
a lesser extent in graduate schools of economics and by practicing economists in
governmental agencies and businesses tends to ignore or unduly minimize the import of
well-established literature on major and important issues related to monopoly power,
international trade, the environment and sustainability, wealth and income distribution,
legal structure, institutional environment, and human behavior. See generally CONTEMPORARY
CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS (J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert
Boyer eds., 1997) (arguing that the market may not be the model arrangement for the
management of economic activity); HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1996) (arguing that the concept of sustainable growth is
being interpreted and used in ways that are not only wrong, but also potentially
dangerous); HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING
THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
(2d ed. 1994) (demonstrating how neoclassical economics and reliance on an industrial
economy focused on growth ultimately lead to environmental disaster and how this
might be rectified); MARK A. LUTZ & KENNETH LUX, THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANISTIC
ECONOMICS (1979) (using Maslow’s hierarchy of wants to argue that western notions of
capitalism are not morally defensible and that humanistic adjustments are required to
increase economic welfare); HUGH SCHWARTZ, RATIONALITY GONE AWRY?: DECISION
MAKING INCONSISTENT WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL THEORY (1998) (investigating
the increasing evidence of economic irregularity based on traditional economic theory
and arguing for a broad behavioral structure for economics and investment); SOCIAL
STRUCTURES OF ACCUMULATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH AND CRISIS
(David M. Kotz et al. eds., 1994) (examining the economies of Japan, South Africa,
Puerto Rico, and the United States in order to explain the success or failure of economies
based on the influence of political and economic institutions); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (discussing both the positive and negative
aspects of globalization); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977) (questioning the
neoclassical economic assumption that man is motivated purely by self-interest); Herbert
A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE
CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 25 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W.
Reder eds., 1987) (arguing that economic rationality forms only a part of the premises in
economic reasoning and calling for an empirically founded theory of choice); Harry M.
Trebing, Market Failure in Public Utility Industries: An Institutionalist Critique of
Deregulation, in INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC POLICY 287 (Marc R. Tool &
Paul Dale Bush eds., 2003) (arguing that the neoclassical approach is unrealistic when
applied to real-world utility markets); Harry M. Trebing, New Dimensions of Market
Failure in Electricity and Natural Gas Supply, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 395 (2001) (discussing
the institutional view of market failure and the use of market power by analyzing
California’s electricity and natural gas shortages).
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uncontroversial,”39 the neoclassical economic approach advanced to students
ignores widespread economic controversy based on contributions that
John Maynard Keynes (who receives not so much as a mention in Judge
Posner’s book), Nobel Prize winners in economics, and other able
economists have made to economic theory and practice, contributions
that shape the law and economic policy of every so-called free market
economy in the world. Thus, passing off law and neoclassical economics
for law and economics has had the effect of misinforming several
generations of law students (many of whom have become law professors,
and many more who have beome lawyers) by ignoring other approaches
to economics that students need to understand in order to put the wealthmaximizing claims of law and neoclassical economics in accurate
perspective and to understand the full scope of issues related to wealth
maximization.
B. Some Problems with Passing Off Neoclassical
Economics as Economics
In light of lawyers’ professional responsibility to serve clients and of
law teachers’ professional responsibility to teach students, a number of
important deficiencies result from passing off the neoclassical approach
to economics as the only approach to law and economics. Specifically,
passing off law and neoclassical economics for law and economics (1)
confuses a microeconomic theory of efficiency with wealth maximization
and growth, (2) fails to address the persistence of unutilized productive
capacity, (3) fails to acknowledge positive controversies regarding
neoclassical principles and their application in context, and (4) falsely
teaches that the noteworthy major controversies regarding the neoclassical
approach relevant to law are all value-based and do not include factbased controversies relative to efficiency and wealth maximization.
Each of these points is discussed in turn below.

39.

POSNER, supra note 26, at 253.

149

ASHFORD TWO.DOC

9/17/2019 4:15 PM

1. Neoclassical Efficiency Theory Is Not a General Growth
Theory of Wealth Maximization
Perhaps the most serious and pervasive, but least recognized, false
impression resulting from passing off neoclassical economics for
economics is the widespread confusion that results from treating the
theory of neoclassical efficiency as though it were synonymous with a
comprehensive theory of societal wealth maximization or growth. In
advancing his neoclassical approach to the analysis of law, for example,
Judge Posner states, “What Adam Smith referred to as a nation’s wealth,
what this book refers to as efficiency, and what a layman might call the
size of the pie, has always been an important social value . . . .”40 Judge
Posner compounds his error by declaring that the connection between
efficiency and growth is “uncontroversial.”41
As a matter of positive economics, however, efficiency and growth are
quite distinct concepts. Microeconomic efficiency is not a general
theory of growth or wealth maximization, which was the focus of Adam
Smith. In a shrinking, dying economy, every transaction might be
neoclassically efficient, and various conceptions of efficiency (whether
as defined by Marshall, Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks, or others) could be,
nevertheless, invariably satisfied. In fact, neoclassical efficiency, even
when positively related to growth and wealth maximization, is only one
component of a much more complicated dynamic process that requires a
broader approach to economics along with other disciplines to
comprehend.
Since the dawn of the industrial revolution and increasingly so ever
40. Id. at 252. Judge Posner offers no theory for the relationship between economic
principles and wealth maximization growth other than those neoclassical principles
based on allocative efficiency. In many contexts, Judge Posner equates efficiency with
wealth maximization. For example, in discussing the moral content of the common law,
Judge Posner declares, “Efficiency or wealth maximization is an important thread in the
ethical tapestry [of the common law], but it is not the only one.” Id. at 265. This false
impression is promoted by many others. For example, other economists have argued that
what is socially optimal under any measure of social welfare is for the net
amount of pie produced to be as large as possible—this is efficiency—and
then for the pie to be sliced up and distributed in a way that is best according
to the particular measure of social welfare under consideration.
HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 369 (2003).
41. POSNER, supra note 26, at 253. Judge Posner also states the following:
The rate of economic growth is the rate at which the output of a society
increases. Since growth is fostered by using resources more efficiently, there
is a sense, but a rather uncontroversial one, in which the common law, insofar
as it is shaped by a concern with efficiency, may be said to have fostered
growth.
Id. at 252.
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since, technology brings forth vast increases in productive capacity that
are not primarily the result of the gains promised by marginal efficiency.
For example, the great gains in wealth experienced in the United States
since the 1850s are not continuous increments driven by marginal prices
with causes rooted in constant technology and short time frames (which
are the domain of neoclassical economics). Rather, these are discontinuous,
sometimes explosively large changes in productive capacity and the
distribution of demand with causes rooted in technological progress and
capital investment, subject to limited competition, aided by government
allocation and the protection of property rights.
Major breakthroughs in productive capacity occasioning great increases
in wealth are not primarily the result of efficiency gains at the margin.
In the corporate context, for example, major corporations flourish or fail
in the surplus generated long before market prices of their factor inputs
and products approach efficient equilibrium. In this context, corporate
wealth maximization requires maximizing both (1) “normal profits”
(those earned in perfectly competitive markets) and (2) “abnormal
profits” (those earned in the context of substantial technological
advances and other conditions of imperfect efficiency).42
The major elements in economic growth observed in market economies
experiencing substantial growth occur when relevant markets are far
from achieving perfect efficiency, when prices are far from the theoretical
equilibrium, and when any growth effects of relatively efficient resource
allocation are comparatively low or even negative. This is not to say that
efficiency is not an important consideration in wealth-maximizing
analysis, but it does not play the unambiguous role in wealth
maximization that neoclassical law and economics ascribes to it.43
Nevertheless, the principles of neoclassical efficiency are widely and
loosely advanced by those who pass off law and neoclassical economics
as the sole theory of law and economics and as a de facto theory of
42. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1934)
(describing an economic theory of growth based on technological development). While
Schumpeter developed a powerful analysis of the real-world process of growth, the
analysis does not form any part of the neoclassical paradigm. It is therefore another
instance where the socioeconomic approach to law is more realistic than the so-called
law and economics approach.
43. “Mr. [Steve] Keen, an economist at Australia’s University of Western Sydney,
says he objects to neoclassical economics because ‘it makes capitalism a worse system
than it would otherwise be, and makes it function less well as a generator of wealth and
innovation.’” Monaghan, supra note 16, at A12.
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causation regarding growth and wealth maximization.44 Analysis largely
limited to such constructs as Pareto optimality, Edgeworth boxes, and
rational choice theory confuse marginal gains with wealth maximization
and ignore the effect of the distribution of wealth, opportunities, risks,
and uncertainties45 that can greatly affect wealth maximization and
distribution over time in ways not comprehended by marginal efficiency
analysis.
The pervasive and continuing confusion between the neoclassical
promise of “efficiency maximization” with the broader question of
economic growth and societal wealth maximization is clearly revealed
by Judge Posner’s defense of the neoclassical benefits of “more or less”
free markets advanced in The Problems of Jurisprudence, when he
declared the following:
[I]n general people who live in societies in which markets are allowed to
function more or less freely not only are wealthier than people in other societies
but have more political rights, more liberty and dignity, are more content (as
evidenced, for example, by their being less prone to emigrate)—so that wealth
maximization may be the most direct route to a variety of moral ends.46

Socioeconomists question Judge Posner’s unsubstantiated assumptions
that the theory of neoclassical efficiency and strict legal adherence to its
precepts (1) establish or invariably enhance the necessary conditions for
competitive markets and (2) are respectively the primary explanation
and the main cause of the per capita economic growth and greater wealth
that can be observed.
One of the worst ways in which to serve a client is to focus on a less
important aspect of a problem at the expense of neglecting a more
important aspect as a result of either failing to identify or diverting
attention from the more important aspect. The neoclassical preoccupation
with and emphasis on efficiency as the sole or primary cause of wealth
maximization and growth does just that. Professional competence
requires lawyers to accurately distinguish between the more important
and the less important and to devote their efforts (and if necessary
instruct their clients) consistent with the priorities revealed by that
distinction.

44. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 369.
45. For an important distinction between risk and uncertainty that neoclassical
market theory tends to ignore, see KEEN, supra note 15, at 200–02.
46. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1990).
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2. Neoclassical Economics Fails to Address Unutilized
Productive Capacity
Another major problem with passing off law and neoclassical
economics as the sole theory of law and economics is that it ignores the
phenomenon of persistent (and, many would say, growing) unutilized
productive capacity (including unemployed and underemployed workers) in
the context of supposedly increasingly competitive markets. By failing
to draw attention to the existence of unutilized productive capacity,
those who teach law and neoclassical economics as law and economics
according to the approach of Judge Posner fail to inform their students of
one of the greatest economic problems (important to clients) that
neoclassical theory fails to address.
Thus, if asked to determine the facts, the general counsel of most
prime creditworthy companies would (after completing the due diligence
of consulting with all appropriate experts) conclude that their companies
(even as they determine that the immediate need to effect major
downsizings, plant closings, and layoffs) owned the productive capacity
(with available capital assets and labor) to profitably increase output by
perhaps ten to twenty percent if there were only customers with money
to buy what could be readily produced at even lower unit costs. This
would apply not only to consumer goods, but also to producer goods, so
that within existing unutilized productive capacity, there is the capacity
to create even more unutilized productive capacity. If some measure of
that unutilized productive capacity could be profitably employed, corporate
profits and shareholder wealth would increase accordingly. The question
for the corporate fiduciary (including the corporate lawyer) is the
following: What economic, financial, engineering, marketing, ethical,
political, and legal strategies can be employed to most profitably
acquire, employ, and dispose of its assets?
The persistence of unutilized productive capacity is (or should be) also
a matter of central concern to advocates for the economically disadvantaged,
the environment, and other worthy causes (including those who favor
better corporate management and a robust scope for corporate social
responsibility) and to public servants vested with the responsibility to
promote national economic welfare. Unutilized productive capacity of
an economy’s major corporations means a capacity to provide more
basic necessities (such as food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and
health care), more simple comforts and conveniences, by way of greener
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and more socially responsible industrial processes and practices, as well
as more employment. Many threatened plant closings, downsizings, and
layoffs are reflections of unutilized productive capacity. Many greener
ways of producing goods and services that go unutilized are reflections
of unutilized productive capacity. Despite neoclassical assumptions of
diminishing returns, the unused productive capacity is generally marked
by diminishing unit costs and increasing economies of production made
unprofitable only by insufficient consumer demand for more production
even at discount selling prices.
However, neoclassical economics has little to say about unutilized
productive capacity. In the world of perfect neoclassical efficiency,
unutilized capacity (beyond the need to satisfy peaks in market demand
and some additional capacity for emergencies beyond the predictable)
should not exist for long. But it has. By scientific standards, persistent
unutilized productive capacity is an anomaly of major significance
which belies the neoclassical assumption that markets are efficient or
nearly efficient.
Accordingly, as a discipline, economics has long recognized that
something more than neoclassical economics is necessary to address the
phenomenon of unutilized productive capacity. In response to the Great
Depression, when, unlike present times, the existence of vast unutilized
productive capacity became a politically undeniable fact that could not
be ignored, Keynesian economics was introduced as a major element of
government economic policy in the United States and other Westernstyle capitalist economies precisely to deal with the persistence of
unutilized productive capacity. As a consequence, since the Great Depression,
in practical effect, present law and economic policy in all of the world’s
major so-called market economies is a mixed compromise of classical,
neoclassical, and Keynesian theory and practice.
According to Keynesian economics, there is a systemic market failure
that belies the neoclassical assumptions of perfect efficiency; untapped
growth potential, unutilized productive capacity, underemployment of
labor, and suboptimal allocation of resources persist despite classical and
neoclassical economic theory to the contrary. Markets are far from
perfectly competitive, and their operation results in a persistent shortfall
in “effective demand” for consumption, employment, and investment.
The result is an endemic underutilization of resources that can be at least
partially corrected by government action.
Accordingly, in light of persistent unutilized productive capacity, if
increasing the size of the pie is a goal of using principles of economics
to guide the legal system, then a competent, lawyerly approach to
economic issues needs more than neoclassical economics to shape legal
policy. As taught in law schools, law and economics should not begin
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and end with neoclassical economic analysis, but must begin with a
foundation broad enough to accommodate at least the insights provided
by Keynesian and other economic approaches that recognize the reality
of unutilized capacity, including willing but unemployed workers whose
preferences are not adequately reflected in microeconomic demand
curves.
3. The Neoclassical Preoccupation with Efficiency Maximization that
Results from Passing Off Neoclassical Economics for Economics
Fails to Acknowledge Fairly Major Positive Controversies
Regarding the Principles and Application of Neoclassical
Economics in Context
In addition to the foregoing deficiencies in the neoclassical approach
to law and economics, a number of other positive controversies frequently
discussed in literature are minimized or ignored by Judge Posner’s
approach to law and economics.47 Several are addressed below.
a. The Efficiency-Maximizing Promise of the Neoclassical Approach to
Law and Economics Depends on the Extent to Which Efficient
Markets Exist and Efficient Bargaining Occurs in Fact
As noted above, analysis of wealth maximization that depends on
assumptions of perfect efficiency is inherently misleading. The accuracy
of the assumption of perfect efficiency requires the prevalence of perfect
competition in all industries—something that is manifestly not the case
in reality in any economy in the world.
In the real economy, inhabited by creditworthy corporate giants,
markets are full of inefficiencies and path-dependent, suboptimal equilibria;
transactions costs are substantial; information is imperfect; autonomy is
limited; rationality is bounded; satisfying rather than maximizing is a
common practice; collusion, free-riding, shirking, and skimming abound;
monopolistic practices flourish; major sectors of every so-called free
market economy are subsidized, regulated, and protected; labor and
capital markets are regulated and protected; government is a big factor in
47. Many of the deficiencies of law and neoclassical economics are discussed by
economist A. Allan Schmid. See Schmid, supra note 18, at 37–48. Although questioning the
proliferation of labels regarding the interdisciplinary connection between law and
economics, Professor Schmid makes an excellent case for a broader approach to law and
economics under the name of institutional law and economics. Id. at 33–36.
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terms of taxing, spending, and controlling credit and money; nonmarket
relations and forces intervene in the markets to advantage some and
burden others; capital investment is a variable; and technology is
dynamically changing and producing unexpected positive and negative
consequences. In short, although clearly more efficient than centrally
controlled economies, the somewhat free market economies of the
United States and other industrial nations are at best in a state of
imperfect competition, relative inefficiency, and suboptimal
employment of available resources. In the real world of imperfect
competition, distribution-dependent, relative efficiencies can as easily be
called relative inefficiencies, because as a positive matter, neither
economics nor law can determine how far from the conditions of perfect
efficiency are the conditions inherent in any particular distribution of
wealth.
b. Under Conditions of Imperfect Competition, One Cannot Assume
that Legal Incentives to Promote Microeconomic Efficiency
of Behavior, Transactions, and Classes of Transactions
Will Increase, Rather than Decrease, Total Economic
Efficiency and Wealth
In the case of imperfect competition, efficiency gains in one context
achieved by a particular legal rule may result in greater efficiency losses
in others.48 Monopolists and oligopolists can capitalize on efficiency
48. The false notion that microeconomic efficiency will necessarily be reflected in
greater overall societal efficiency is a fallacy that most undergraduate students in
economics understand as the “compositional fallacy” and which is explored in
considerable economic literature as “the theory of second best.” Tucked away in a
footnote, Judge Posner declares that the “empirical significance of this type of problem
(the problem of the ‘second best’) is dubious.” POSNER, supra note 26, at 279 n.1. But
many economists disagree. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and
Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 7 (1998) (stating that
second-best theory “has critical implications for the proper approach to allocativeefficiency analysis”). Also consider the following articles by Richard Markovits in favor
of the theory: Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy
Analysis in Our Worse-than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the
Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 950;
Markovits, supra note 33; Richard S. Markovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second
Best, and The Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. L. REV. 567 (1979)
(reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978)); Richard S. Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-BestAllocatively-Efficient Tort Law in Our Worse-than-Second-Best World: The Whys and
Some Therefores, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 313 (1996); Richard S. Markovits, SecondBest Theory and the Obligations of Academics: A Reply to Professor Donohue, 73 CHI.KENT L. REV. 267 (1998); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and the Standard
Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable Critique, a “Sociological”
Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1993).
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gains here to destroy otherwise effective competition in another quarter.
One cannot reliably assume that the formulation of legal policy to
achieve microeconomic efficiency in a particular context will not
adversely affect efficiency elsewhere to produce a net decrease in total
efficiency.49
c. Efficiency Is Dependent on Distribution
Another major misrepresentation that results from passing off neoclassical
economics as the sole theory of economics is the false notion that
efficiency maximization has rigorous meaning independent of distribution
in theory and in fact. In this regard, recall that the supposedly wealthenhancing, allocational benefits of perfectly efficient markets assumes
that prices will lead to the optimal allocation of resources, labor, production,
distribution, and consumption. As a positive matter of economics, however,
the same logic that holds that prices determine distribution also holds
that distribution determines prices. No standard of efficiency is or can
be distributively neutral. Even when transactions costs can be assumed
to be zero and externalities are negligible or nonexistent, the assignment
of property rights nevertheless affects prices and the allocation of
resources.
d. There Is No One Single Paramount Optimal Efficiency to Guide
Judge Posner’s Efficiency Ethic of the Common Law, but
Many Distribution-Dependent Relative Efficiencies
The fact that efficiency is dependent on distribution belies a misleading
supposition of Judge Posner’s approach to law and economics: the false
proposition that there is a single, determinable, wealth-maximizing standard
of efficiency (independent of distribution) which can guide the common
law in its decisionmaking. In economic theory and fact, there is no
single paramount optimal efficiency, but rather, many distributiondependent relative efficiencies.50
49. “A rule that is optimal considering all possible events (probability summing to
one) is different from one that considers only the event that is the subject of a particular
court suit.” Schmid, supra note 18, at 45.
50. Warren J. Samuels, Maximization of Wealth as Justice: An Essay on Posnerian
Law and Economics as Policy Analysis, 60 TEX. L. REV. 147, 153 (1981) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)) (“[T]here is no unique wealth
maximizing result, only results specific to the rights structure that supports the existing
distribution of wealth.”); Schmid, supra note 18, at 37.
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e. Reliance on the Coase Theorem as the Foundation for Law and
Economics Is Contrary to Fact and History
Although widely cited as the twentieth century foundation of law and
economics, the Coase Theorem51 (the notion that even in the presence of
externalities, “if transactions are costless, the initial assignment of a
property right will not affect the use of the property”52 because
bargaining will efficiently allocate not only goods but also costs to
maximize wealth)53 is not grounded in reality; for example, consider
negligible transaction costs, voluntary exchange, efficient markets, and
the irrelevance of initial and consequential wealth distribution by way of
supposedly voluntary, efficient exchanges. The law and neoclassical
economic analysis regarding transactions costs, opportunity costs, and
externalities, which is used to structure legal rules to facilitate or mimic
the promised efficiency maximization of the neoclassical approach,
ignores a number of objections advanced by many economists, including
the following: (1) “opportunity costs are not independent of law and thus
cannot instruct the law,”54 (2) “[e]xternalities are ubiquitous, and the
problem for law is to bring order and predictability as to who can create
externality for whom (who is the buyer and who is seller of
opportunities)—not just how to facilitate trade,”55 and (3) “[t]he fact
Since efficiency is always rooted in some distribution of rights, it can never
be a basis for judging that distribution. Rights are antecedent to efficiency
calculations. . . . [I]t is not meaningful to conceptualize policy issues as
efficiency versus distribution. The issue is efficiency 1 versus efficiency 2,
each with a different starting place that resolves the question of power. . . .
....
. . . Law affects costs and demand curves, and thus the optimal law is not
simply a matter of the analyst finding where marginal cost equals marginal
benefit. Resource allocation and distribution are empirically interdependent,
not matters to be separately determined or traded off.
Id. at 37, 48 (citation omitted).
51. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 378.
Curiously, however, after Bentham [1789], the economic approach to law lay
largely dormant until the 1960s and 1970s. In that period, Coase (1960) wrote
a provocative article on the incentives to reduce harm to neighbors engendered
by property rights assignments . . . and Posner wrote a comprehensive textbook
(1972) . . . .
Id. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(setting forth the model of efficiency that has become known as the Coase Theorem).
Like Judge Posner, these and other scholars fail to recognize and inform their students of
the law and economics foundation established by John R. Commons.
52. POSNER, supra note 26, at 7.
53. DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 41 (1992) (“In a free market with no obstacles to bargaining between the
parties, voluntary exchange allocates goods to their most valuable uses.”).
54. Schmid, supra note 18, at 45.
55. Id. at 48.

158

ASHFORD TWO.DOC

[VOL. 41: 133, 2004]

9/17/2019 4:15 PM

Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

that a price is paid to an owner . . . does not mean that the person
accepts the distribution of opportunity and power—only that the
payment is better than the alternative cost given the rights structure.”56
These and other objections have been well-stated in legal scholarship.57
Given the realities of every economy in the world and the history of the
economic analysis of law, it is more accurate to say that the twentieth
century foundation for law and economics begins with John R. Commons,
rather than Ronald Coase.58
4. The Main Arguments Against the Law and Neoclassical Approach to
Law and Economics Are Not Only Value-Based Arguments
Although each of the deficiencies set forth above reflects objections to
law and neoclassical economics based on positive grounds, after wrongly
equating efficiency maximization with wealth maximization, Judge
Posner characterizes competing alternatives to the efficiency ethic as
“competing social values . . . [that] have mainly to do with ideas about
the just distribution of income and wealth—ideas around which no
consensus has formed”;59 whereas in fact, on positive grounds, other
economic approaches challenge the theoretical and empirical validity of
the claimed neoclassical economic approach to efficiency and wealth
maximization. By passing off law and neoclassical economics as the
only theory of law and economics, Judge Posner ignores important
positive controversies in economics regarding the application of
microeconomic theory in context, the macroeconomic effect of legal
policy based on neoclassical theory, and the macroeconomic operation
of the economy. Judge Posner thus fails to inform his students that there
is no consensus in economics that microeconomic efficiency in
particular contexts leads to societal efficiency or wealth maximization.
In critiquing or opposing an application of neoclassical analysis, it is not
a competent legal strategy to argue only competing values (however
powerful, pure, and widely accepted they may be) when the lawyer can
also challenge the claim of wealth maximization on the facts with good
56. Id. at 34.
57. See generally Markovits, supra note 33 (critically analyzing the basic conceptual
structure of law and economics as currently presented and practiced).
58. Schmid, supra note 18, at 40, 44; see also COMMONS, supra note 10, at vii
(discussing the legal underpinnings of the economic system); Mercuro & Medema, supra
note 24, at 95.
59. POSNER, supra note 26, at 252.
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economic authority. It is misleading to teach students only the valuebased objections to a thesis when important fact-based objections exist.
In the third edition of Economic Analysis of Law, Judge Posner stated
the following: “The major ethical problem posed by an efficiency approach
to the common law is . . . the discrepancy between efficiency maximization
and notions of the just distribution of wealth.”60 Judge Posner apparently
carefully considered this important misrepresentation because by the
fifth edition, he qualified his assertion, prefacing it with the word
“probably,” so that it reads “Probably the major . . . .”61 Even with this
qualifier, however, Judge Posner fails to alert students to the fact that a
major ethical problem with his efficiency approach is that it assumes
away and ignores positive controversies in economics that are highly
relevant to the duties of lawyers and teachers in regard to clients and
students. This ethical problem of nondisclosure cannot be eliminated
without informing students about positive controversies regarding
neoclassical claims of wealth maximization along with positive alternative
approaches to wealth maximization within the discipline of economics.
IV. THE NEED TO TEACH LAW AND ECONOMICS FROM A
SOCIOECONOMIC FOUNDATION
A. Introduction
Based on the foregoing, if the goal of wealth maximization is an
important reason for offering courses, course segments, and subject
matter labeled “law and economics” and for teaching law-related
economic issues within other law school courses, then as matter of
positive understanding and professional responsibility it is necessary to
include an economic approach broader than one limited to neoclassical
economics. Furthermore, it is better yet to ground that broader approach
on the scientific, paradigm-conscious, and value-conscious foundation
established by the definition of socioeconomics so that the approach to
economic understanding will remain flexibly open to improvement in a
principled way and at a pace that has not always been reflected in
departments of economics.
Broadening the economics of law and economics to include classical
and Keynesian economic analysis will clearly enrich the offering.
Together with neoclassical analysis, these approaches have served as the
main economic theories that shape the law and economic policies of all
major so-called market economies for more than sixty years. Lawyers
60.
61.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 240 (3d ed. 1986).
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 286 (5th ed. 1998); see also
POSNER, supra note 26, at 266.
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and law students with the fuller understanding of law-related economic
issues provided by the combination of classical, neoclassical, and
Keynesian economics would clearly be able to better fulfill their
professional responsibilities than lawyers and students who understand
only the neoclassical approach. But the broadening of economics should
not stop there for several reasons.
First, these approaches (alone and in combination) have not satisfactorily
explained in an uncontroversial way either the process of economic
growth or the anomaly of unutilized capacity; nor have they provided an
effective strategy or institutional environment to employ the unutilized
capacity profitably and to promote sustainable growth. As a result of
perceived inadequacies of classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian economics
in various important contexts, other economic approaches (including
Austrian, behavioral, binary, contextual, ecological, humanistic, institutional,
and post-Keynesian economics) have emerged to address problems and
search for solutions that classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian economics
have failed to successfully address and discover. Although frequently
ignored by many mainstream economists, some exposure to one or more
of these additional approaches would enrich a course in law and economics.
However, even such a broadening of law and economics beyond the
core of mainstream economic theories does not fully address a dynamic
question for lawyers: Given ongoing development of understanding
regarding law-related economic issues, what approaches are needed to
enable lawyers and law teachers to fulfill their professional responsibilities
regarding the subject? What approaches might be helpful to Anne,
Bruce, Daphne, and Clark in serving clients and students?
1. The Lawyer’s Duty of Investigation
It is well settled that corporate fiduciaries are duty bound to base their
decisions on informed judgment. In determining whether this duty is
met or breached, the issue is “whether the directors have informed
themselves ‘ . . . of all material information reasonably available to
them.’”62 In formulating and implementing legal policy and representing
clients, competence requires no less of attorneys. When charged with
responsibilities to serve the clients’ urgent concerns regarding lawrelated economic issues (such as those related to unutilized productive
62. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
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capacity and poverty), lawyers have an affirmative duty of inquiry
regarding relevant facts and law. Their duty is to be proactive, to act
expeditiously, without waiting for others to act.
Some people may be reluctant to entertain approaches at variance with
widely accepted economic assumptions.
For some people, this
reluctance is based on the belief that society is thereby protected from
the wasteful and unsettling pursuit of unreal promises and from the
adverse effects of unintended consequences. For others, it may be based
on their perceived interest in the status quo, including the belief that it
takes much more work to reexamine fundamental assumptions than to
require others to learn them. Therefore, a burden of persuasion is placed
on the innovator who would alter the status quo (and the distribution of
wealth, opportunities, risks, and uncertainties it protects). But, as a
matter of professional responsibility on behalf of their clients, lawyers
have an affirmative duty of positive investigation. Consistent with that
duty, like other fiduciaries, lawyers may not simply sit idly by because
some other person has not met a burden of persuasion.
2. The Concept of the Prima Facie Case
In this regard, law has a useful concept for promoting beneficial
change and for correcting injustices otherwise protected by the status
quo: namely, the concept of the prima facie case. The concept of the
prima facie case lightens the burden of innovators and critics of the
status quo by requiring of them only sufficient proof to call upon the
defenders of the status quo to respond.63 The concept of the prima facie
case, together with the definition of socioeconomics, can assist lawyers
and law teachers in approaching law-related socioeconomic issues. As a
matter of law and economic inquiry, theories and approaches that satisfy
the requirements explicit and implicit in the definition of socioeconomics,
but that seemingly conflict with economic analysis, may be seen as
having sustained the burden of making a prima facie case and therefore
are in need of further investigation even though they seemingly conflict
with accepted economic analysis.
Because economics is an evolving discipline that historically has been,
and continues to be, rather resistant to consider (from a paradigm-neutral
perspective) economic approaches that conflict with mainstream thinking, if
wealth maximization is a major goal of teaching law and economics,
then when teaching law and economics, theories beyond mainstream
63. OTIS H. FISK, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW OF PROOF IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
49–62 (1928).

162

ASHFORD TWO.DOC

9/17/2019 4:15 PM

[VOL. 41: 133, 2004]

Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

economics (including those at and beyond the margin of economics) that
(1) meet the standards of a prima facie case, and (2) promise substantial
wealth maximization beyond the promise of neoclassical efficiency
should not be kept from law students. Rather, such theories should be
given rigorous consideration in law schools from the paradigm-neutral
perspective offered by the definition of socioeconomics, even though
mainstream economics has shown little or no interest in exploring them.
Using the concept of the prima facie case, law schools can provide a
forum in which ideas neglected by economists, but relevant to the
operation of the economy, can be given a hearing.
B. Promising Theories and Approaches Neglected by the
Discipline of Economics
There are some people who may believe that, by becoming more open
to approaches that challenge its basic assumptions, economics will be
inundated with dubious approaches. In reality, however, there are not
many approaches at or beyond the margins of economics that meet the
standards of the scientific method (workable assumptions, internal
consistency, and predictions capable of being verified or refuted) and
promise substantial wealth maximization and distribution by way of a
logic not ultimately based on classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian
economics. For example, if every member school of the Association of
American Law Schools were to devote one seminar to the exploration of
one approach to wealth maximization that meets the foregoing standards
but is nevertheless generally not explored in schools and departments of
economics, the schools would run out of new candidates to explore in a
few years at most. Two such approaches are especially noteworthy: one
by Treval Powers, a distinguished research chemist, and the other by
Louis Kelso, an eminent corporate lawyer and investment banker. To
explore more fully the importance of a socioeconomic approach to law
and economics, these are discussed briefly below. Consideration of
these approaches helps to reveal how a socioeconomic approach to the
analysis of law-related economic issues can aid in the fulfillment of the
professional responsibilities of lawyers and law teachers.
1. The Leakage Theory of Treval Powers
If wealth maximization is a major goal of teaching law and
economics, then theories beyond economics and at the margin of
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economics may deserve a hearing in law that they are unlikely to get
from all but a very few economists. A good example of this proposition
can be found in a book called Leakage: The Bleeding of the American
Economy, by chemist Treval Powers.64 In Leakage, the reader is
presented with an alternative theory of the operation of the American
economy based on an extensive statistical analysis of U.S. economic data
from 1878 through 1995. The theory was developed by a distinguished
scientist over a period of almost twenty-five years. Dr. Powers
summarized his conclusions as follows:
(1) “After more than two hundred years of thinking and
discussion, there was . . . little indication that economists
had reached, or ever would reach a durable consensus
about the nature of economics.”
(2) “[S]tudies of economics were now, and had been, badly
imbalanced; too much a priori thinking, not enough skilled
observation of economic behavior.”
(3) “[T]he vocabulary and syntax of the language of economic
theory are mostly unsuited to the descriptions and
discussions of the findings of this study.”
(4) “Writers of economic textbooks emphasize the point that
economics is a ‘soft science,’ apparently meaning that they
find it impossible to verify their deductions by scientific
methods.”
(5) “[I]t simply is not true that the behavior of the national
economy [of the United States] is not predictable.”
(6) “Generally, the statistical record [of the United States for
the last 125 years] proved sufficient . . . [to] provide an
understanding of how the nation as a whole is functioning
economically . . . quite different from any of the understandings
developed from the evolution of economic theories.”
(7) “[S]aving and investment do not play the part that
economic theory gives them. In fact, the performance of
the nation as a whole, the macroeconomy, shows that at
that level, savings is always a negative factor, for it is in
fact leakage, and as such actually bleeds the vitality from
our nation’s native productivity.”
(8) “[T]he national income is never inadequate; it is always
the amount necessary for full scale production. But some
of it is not being used for production of goods and
64.
(1996).
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services; it is being allowed to ‘leak’ from the ‘stream’ of
productive circulation. Leakage always reduces the economic
output, and at times the rate of leakage exceeds the growth
capability of the nation, the result being a shrinking of the
economy. Leakage is nearly always present, reducing the
rate of economic growth and at times producing negative
growth.”
(9) “Analysis of the actual data showed the nation has a
practically constant capability for growth of approximately
11.4 percent per year per capita. That figure plus the
exponential rate of growth of the population has produced
various totals ranging from about 12 to 13 percent per
year.”65
In some respects, Dr. Powers’s analysis seems Keynesian, suboptimal
employment resulting from the failure of the aggregate of all producers
(which Dr. Powers calls the “composite producer”) to distribute sufficient
purchasing power to consumers (the “composite consumer”) to cause the
full utilization of existing productive capacity. However, Dr. Powers’s
conclusion regarding (1) “savings . . . [as] always a negative factor” in
macroeconomic growth, (2) the predictability of the operation of the
U.S. economy, (3) the mathematics supporting his predictions, and (4)
(most importantly) the magnitude of the predicted growth potential
(above eleven percent), all indicate that an analysis very different from
Keynesian economics is involved.66
Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the prospect of such an
untapped growth potential is a matter of great interest to the clients of
Anne, Bruce, and Daphne, and to Clark’s students. Indeed, the growth
predicted by Dr. Powers is immense. If even one quarter of that growth
rate could have been achieved from 1900, the resulting production
would, by far, eclipse the gains promised by pursuit of any generally
recognized conventional economic theory. A sustained growth rate of
even five percent over a decade would make an extraordinary difference,
for example, to (1) corporate profits, (2) shareholder wealth, (3) the
economically disadvantaged, (4) the available funding for education,
medical research, and countless social causes that languish for more
resources, (5) the abatement of many environmental degradations that
65.
66.

Id. at x–xii, 25.
Id.
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could be ameliorated if people could afford more expensive products and
services made by way of greener technologies, (6) the funds available
for financial aid to students (who every year graduate more in debt), and
(7) government revenues, indebtedness, deficits, and budgets. In light of
these potential gains, it is as though advocates guided only by
conventional theory have been arguing and negotiating over small
change. The prediction of sustainable growth of such a magnitude is a
remarkable conclusion from a scientist that should be of great interest to
lawyers and law teachers interested in wealth maximization; but because
they are so far beyond the present realm of economic understanding,
they may not even be considered by many economists in the near future.
For lawyers and law teachers committed to the principles of socioeconomics,
however, there is good reason not to wait for rigorous attention from
economists before beginning to explore the issues raised by Dr. Powers,
especially when attention from lawyers and law teachers may hasten the
exploration by economists as well. In principle, the work of Treval
Powers is an experiment that can either be replicated or refuted by other
scientists, mathematicians, and economists. Admittedly, the validation
or refutation of promising work like that of Dr. Powers is the work of
people with advanced mathematical skills and cannot be expected to be
achieved by most students enrolled in law school courses; but students
can certainly be informed of the existence of such work, particularly in
contexts in which a more limited understanding of wealth maximization
would otherwise be presented as unquestioned truth.
2. The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso
The notion that the broader approach to economic issues explicit in the
definition of socioeconomics can promote a broader approach to
economics among economists is revealed by the slow but growing
acceptance of binary economics by professional economists.67 Like the
67. Binary economics was first advanced by corporate finance attorney, investment
banker, and philosopher, Louis Kelso. See LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE
CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958) [hereinafter KELSO & ADLER, MANIFESTO] (presenting
detailed suggestions for repairing and refining the present economic system in order to
create an economically just and generally affluent society); LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA
HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING THE ESOP REVOLUTION
(1991) (arguing in favor of an economic democracy and for worker ownership of capital
as a way to reach that goal); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE NEW
CAPITALISTS: A PROPOSAL TO FREE ECONOMIC GROWTH FROM THE SLAVERY OF SAVINGS
(1961); LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER, TWO-FACTOR THEORY: THE ECONOMICS OF
REALITY (1967) (arguing that the usual methods employed to finance corporate
enterprises lead to socialized ownership of productive capital through the systemized
concentration of ownership). The authoritative and most complete source of writings by
Louis Kelso (the originator of binary economics) can be found on the web site of The
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leakage theory of Dr. Powers, binary economics speaks directly to the
question of persistent unutilized productive capacity. Louis Kelso, the
originator of binary economics, predicted growth potential of the
American economy roughly comparable to the predictions of Dr.
Powers, but went even further by providing a specific theoretical and
practical means by which to achieve that growth. Like Dr. Powers’s
leakage approach, binary economics is in some ways similar to
Keynesian economics, but in several crucial aspects offers an entirely
different understanding of production and growth. Like Keynesian
economics and the approach of Dr. Powers, binary economics sees
economies like that of the United States as substantially inefficient and
recognizes endemic unutilized productive capacity that results from the
market’s failure to distribute sufficient effective demand.
However, in several critical respects, binary economics differs from
Keynesian economics. In his General Theory, Keynes distilled the
economy to three fundamental variables: time, money, and labor.
According to this model, there is only one independent productive
variable: labor. According to the one-factor approach to production
functions, capital is a dependent variable whose only function is to make
labor more productive.68 As a consequence, in analyzing the existence
of unutilized productive capacity and growth with the Keynesian laborKelso Institute. The Kelso Institute, Bibliography, at http://www.kelsoinstitute.org (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004). For the Author’s presentation of binary economics as a distinct
paradigm, see generally ROBERT ASHFORD & RODNEY SHAKESPEARE, BINARY
ECONOMICS: THE NEW PARADIGM (1999); Robert H.A. Ashford, The Binary Economics
of Louis Kelso: A Democratic Private Property System for Growth and Justice, in
CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW ROLE OF PROPERTY 99 (John H. Miller ed., 1994);
Robert H.A. Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis Kelso: The Promise of Universal
Capitalism, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Ashford, Binary Economics]; Robert
Ashford, Louis Kelso’s Binary Economy, 25 J. SOCIO-ECON. 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Ashford, Louis Kelso’s]; Robert Ashford, A New Market Paradigm for Sustainable
Growth: Financing Broader Capital Ownership with Louis Kelso’s Binary Economics,
14 PRAXIS, FLETCHER J. DEV. STUD. 25 (1998).
68. As Keynes states:
It is much preferable to speak of capital as having a yield over the course of its
life in excess of its original cost, than as being productive.
. . . It is preferable to regard labour, including, of course, the personal
services of the entrepreneur and his assistants, as the sole factor of production,
operating in a given environment of technique, natural resources, capital
equipment and effective demand. This partly explains why we have been able
to take the unit of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in our
economic system, apart from units of money and of time.
KEYNES, supra note 29, at 213–14.
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based approach, the distribution of capital ownership is not a
fundamentally significant determinant; and in analyzing the importance
of effective demand, no fundamental distinction is made between the
distribution and the redistribution of income—a distinction fundamental
in law.
In contrast, binary economists insist that the correct modeling of the
economy requires two (that is, “binary”) productive factors: labor and
capital (that is, the human factor and the nonhuman factor). The binary
approach treats capital as an independently productive variable whose
most important role is to replace and vastly supplement the work of
labor with the work of capital rather than to increase productivity.
Therefore, according to binary economics, (1) the distribution of capital
ownership has a potent positive effect on growth that is obscured in
theory and suppressed in practice by treating capital as though its only or
primary function is to increase the productivity of labor, rather than to
do vastly more of the work itself, and (2) the persistence of unutilized
productive capacity and the market’s failure to distribute effective
demand are the direct consequence of the concentrated distribution of
capital ownership (as distinguished from the distribution or redistribution of
income). Moreover, unlike Keynesian analysis, which does not predict
extraordinary sustainable growth rates substantially above three percent
or so, but more like the independent analysis of Dr. Powers, binary
analysis views the maximum sustainable growth potential of the U.S.
economy to be above nine percent. In short, according to binary
economics, unutilized productive capacity and suboptimal growth are
the result of concentrated ownership.69
But despite (or perhaps in part because of) the binary promise of
enhanced sustainable growth rates, economists have been slow to
consider the binary approach and its prediction of capital-ownershipdistribution-based growth. Although first published in a book entitled
The Capitalist Manifesto in 1957, coauthored by Louis Kelso and
Mortimer Adler (a world-renowned philosopher), it was not until 1996
that the first peer-reviewed journal edited by economists published an
article examining binary economics as a distinct paradigm,70 and not
69. Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Comprehending Corporate Wealth Maximization and Distribution for
Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1531, 1538–41 (2002).
70. KELSO & ADLER, MANIFESTO, supra note 67, Ashford, Louis Kelso’s, supra
note 67. Following this article, the Journal of Socio-Economics published several additional
noteworthy articles: Jerry N. Gauche, Binary Economic Modes for the Privatization of
Public Assets, 27 J. SOCIO-ECON. 445 (1998); Richard Hattwick, Book Review, 30 J.
SOCIO-ECON. 563 (2001); Norman G. Kurland, A New Look at Prices and Money: The
Kelsonian Binary Model for Achieving Rapid Growth Without Inflation, 30 J. SOCIOECON. 495 (2001); see also Norman G. Kurland, The Federal Reserve Discount Window,
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until 1999 that the Journal of Economic Literature formally recognized
“the new binary economic paradigm, which is based on the assumption
that human and nonhuman factors are independently productive and that
the claim on their productive output is a property right.”71
As mentioned above, because Keynesian analysis is built on only three
fundamental variables—time, money, and labor—with labor being the
only productive factor, the distribution of ownership is not a fundamental
determinant of growth or unutilized productive capacity. Indeed, although
they differ in many respects, most economists—whether of neoclassical,
Keynesian, or other persuasion—share in common one unstated
assumption: that unless it can be shown to affect the productivity of
labor, the distribution of capital ownership is not a fundamental determinant
of increased economic output. Given the importance of private property
under law and the Constitution, such an important fundamental
assumption—that the distribution of ownership is not fundamentally
positively related to wealth maximization—should not go unexamined
by lawyers and law teachers from a paradigm-neutral perspective (as it
too frequently has).
From the perspective of scientific principles, it does not seem
unreasonable to assume that capital is “independently productive.”
Consider, for example, trees growing fruit, horses and automobiles
(“self-moving” vehicles that haul and replace walking), vending machines
that replace salespeople, automatic teller machines that replace tellers,
growing varieties of robots doing ever more of the work once done by
humans, and generally machines of all sorts (including computers) that
replace and vastly supplement the work of hundreds and even thousands
of people with the work of increasingly productive capital. From a
paradigm-neutral perspective, it is not inherently unreasonable to conclude
(as Adam Smith did not conclude, and as the Keynes time-money-labor
model does not imply) that in promoting growth, capital does much
more than make labor more productive; it does ever more of the work
itself, and because it is independently productive, the distribution of its
ownership has a positive relationship to growth not comprehended by
classical, neoclassical, or Keynesian economics.
Indeed, as discussed below, at the most fundamental level, once the
capital factor is modeled as one of two independent (or in other words,
10 J. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP L. & FIN. 131 (1998).
71. Annotated Listing of New Books, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1746, 1834–35 (1999).
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binary), productive variables, it can then be thought of as contributing to
growth in six distinct ways. From a binary perspective, capital does far
more than make labor more productive, facilitate labor specialization, or
enable the profitable employment of more workers (as Adam Smith
envisioned its primary function). Increasingly, capital is doing proportionately
ever more of the work.
Based on careful observation, capital reveals six independent powers.
Specifically, capital can (1) replace labor (doing what was formerly done
by labor), (2) vastly supplement the work of labor by employing capital
to do much more of the kind of work that humans can do (such as the
greatly increased hauling that can be done employing horses or trucks),
(3) do work that labor can never do (for example, elevators lift tons
hundreds of feet in the air; airplanes fly; scientific instruments unleash
forces that create computer chips that cannot be made by hand; fruit
trees make fruit while all farmers can do is assist in the process), (4)
work without labor (as in the case of washing machines, automated
machines, robots, and wild fruit-bearing trees), (5) pay for itself out of
its future earnings (the basic rule of business investment), and (6)
distribute the income necessary to purchase its output. The first four
powers concern what might be considered the “real economy” powers of
capital; the latter two are powers that are most clearly revealed in a
private property, market economy with a stable credit system protected
by a reliable legal system. Each of these ways of contributing to growth
(including mere labor replacement, which produces the same output as
before, plus leisure), is significant, but only the first directly involves the
substitution of capital for labor (marginal or otherwise). Thus, although
some economists and policy advocates use marginal efficiency theory as
the foundation for a general theory of growth, in fact the capital-labor
substitution process is only one component of growth (operating after
the employment of greatly increased productive capacity).72
C. Positive and Ethical Responses to Promising Theories
“Outside the Box” of Conventional Economics
When presented with an approach that does not fit neatly into the
classical, neoclassical, or Keynesian paradigms, or some other
recognized economic approach, the usual response of economists is to
dismember and recast it into one or more of the recognized forms. But
such a response is not scientific and will never do justice to a new idea.
The first step in the scientific assessment of a theory is to understand the
theory in its own terms, not merely to assess it with respect to one or
72.
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more preexisting theories. Understanding a theory in its own terms requires
an understanding of its assumptions, its definitions, the fundamental
variables and their relations to one another, and the implications that
flow from them. Thereafter follows an analysis of internal consistency
and then empirical analysis of the descriptions and predictions that
follow. There is nothing scientific about rejecting a new theory because
it conflicts with other theories that are generally accepted or because it
attempts to explain something that is already explained in a different
way by another approach. The scientific test of the value of one
paradigm compared to others is whether it (1) better describes and
predicts more of the relevant observable phenomena or (2) resolves one
or more important anomalies left unexplained or unresolved by others.
Likewise, in law, to do justice to an argument, the first duty of the
lawyer and the judge is to understand the argument in its own terms.
Only then can the argument be fairly judged in the light of precedent,
positive law, and underlying policy. The lawyer or judge who listens to
the beginning of an argument and then interrupts the presenter by saying,
“What you are saying sounds something like what other people have
said before, so I will assume that you are saying what they were saying
and judge accordingly” is doing no justice at all. No scientist,
economist, lawyer, or judge faithful to the definition of socioeconomics
would behave in that way.
It is important to note, moreover, that alternate paradigms need not be
mutually consistent to be useful. Sometimes, paradigms complement
and supplement understanding, as exemplified by the distinct conceptual
contributions to physics made, for example, by Newton, Planck, Heisenberg,
and Einstein. Sometimes, paradigms conflict and are yet informative of
different aspects of the “same” reality, as in wave theory and particle
theory, which are both used to describe the properties of electrons.
Indeed, much economic theory and practice make use of conflicting
neoclassical, Keynesian, behavioral, institutional, and other models to
explain the same behavior. Dr. Powers’s theory of leakage and Louis
Kelso’s binary economics should not, therefore, be excluded from the
array of conceptual tools used to understand economic behavior merely
because their premises conflict with conventional theory or because they
each explain supposedly the same economic behavior in fundamentally
different ways. Even those who highly value the classical, neoclassical,
and Keynesian paradigms should be open to a paradigm-neutral
exploration of the theory of leakage and binary economics to determine

171

ASHFORD TWO.DOC

9/17/2019 4:15 PM

whether they might provide important insights regarding the persistence
of unutilized productive capacity and how it might be profitably
employed to reduce economic deprivation while benefiting everyone.
Unutilized productive capacity to produce more and do better is an
important anomaly to most clients and students, and theories that offer to
explain, predict, and profitably employ it should be considered by
lawyers, even though economists have not yet done so. Although they
start with different premises and employ different methodologies to
reach their conclusions, there is a remarkable congruence between the
analysis of Treval Powers and Louis Kelso. Most notable are their
predictions of extraordinary sustainable growth rates of approximately
the same magnitude. Also notable is their conclusion that savings and
investment do not play the part in promoting growth that conventional
economic theory gives them.
If Anne, Bruce, Clark, and Daphne take seriously their professional
responsibilities to clients, students, and the public interest, including the
duty of positive inquiry, the fact that economics departments have been
slow to consider the approach of Treval Powers and Louis Kelso may
persuade them to explore these subjects and other subjects neglected by
all but a few economists by way of a broader approach to economics
resting on the scientific method and other principles set forth in the
definition of socioeconomics. The exploration of promising ideas
beyond existing paradigms will be aided by institutions, such as the
AALS Section on Socio-Economics, that promote the open-minded but
rigorous approach to economic understanding described in the definition
of socioeconomics.
V. CONCLUSION
One essential role of the lawyer is to help clients identify and secure
their rights and responsibilities. The clients’ economic rights and
responsibilities are an important aspect of the lawyer’s role. Because the
socioeconomic approach is in fundamental harmony with thinking and
acting like a lawyer regarding facts and values, to fulfill this role, it is
not surprising that the rules of professional responsibility implicitly call
upon lawyers to approach law-related economic issues from a
socioeconomic perspective rather than from a perspective limited to law
and neoclassical economics. Lest they teach by bad example, law
teachers should also teach law-related economic issues from a
socioeconomic perspective.
Given an obligation of balance and full disclosure, teaching a subject
labeled “law and economics” from no more than a neoclassical perspective
is problematic because such an approach fails to recognize the full array
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of economic theories and empirical evidence that call into question the
neoclassical approach and provide other ways to comprehend economic
issues and guide legal policy.
Without much qualification and supplementation, the neoclassical
approach does not provide an adequate foundation for teaching lawrelated economic issues, because without a broader foundation, the
neoclassical approach to law and economics (1) confuses a microeconomic
theory of efficiency with wealth maximization and growth,73 (2) fails to
address the persistence of unutilized productive capacity, (3) fails to
address other positive controversies regarding neoclassical principles
and their application in context, and (4) falsely teaches that the major
objections to and controversies regarding the neoclassical approach are
primarily value-based without disclosing relevant objections to law and
neoclassical economics that suggest that it is wrong on the facts.
Although teaching law-related economic issues and offerings in law
and economics would be substantially improved by employing a broader
approach to economics that includes Keynesian, classical, and other
economic approaches, a socioeconomic approach provides an even better
foundation for addressing law-related economic issues and for teaching
law and economics. This is because it is more comprehensive,
interdisciplinary, and open, in a rigorous and even-handed way, to
additional approaches to economic understanding.
Socioeconomists recognize that one of the worst effects that faulty
reliance on paradigms can have on theoretical, empirical, and normative
analysis is to exclude or obscure other approaches and to divert attention
from important principles that must be understood before progress can
be made. For example, every day, people see the sun rise and the sun
set, but what they see is a grand illusion built on a faulty paradigm
resting on a false assumption. When the earth-centered paradigm for the
solar system was replaced by the sun-centered paradigm, a false
73. A neoclassical approach that leaves growth-related theories of distribution at
the door, falsely equates efficiency maximization with wealth maximization, and
generally denies that attempts to broaden distribution could have nothing but negative
effects on overall efficiency and wealth maximization is suspect to many people,
including economists and socioeconomists, who find no unambiguous evidence for such
propositions. See, e.g., KEEN, supra note 15, at 3–4; SOLO, supra note 17, at 91. The
neoclassical approach is highly controversial according to the broader approaches to
economics as taught in economics departments (but ignored in many courses labeled
“law and economics” and in many courses significantly influenced by law and
neoclassical economics). KEN COLE ET AL., WHY ECONOMISTS DISAGREE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF ECONOMICS viii (1983).
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assumption resting on an illusion was replaced by a true assumption
based on facts, and the foundation was laid for the discovery of
Newton’s laws (which make no sense in an earth-centered solar system)
and much of modern science.74
Based on the socioeconomic grounding in the scientific method rather
than the neoclassical paradigm as the starting point for law-related
economic analysis, there is reason to believe that the great emphasis that
neoclassical economics places on efficiency as the sole or primary
means of promoting societal wealth maximization may rest on a false
assumption of causation. The correlation between (1) increased
efficiency and productivity and (2) increased growth may be the result of
a mathematical residual, rather than a causal relationship.75 In other
words, according to many economists, measured increases in productivity
are a consequence rather than a cause of growth.76
Few students earn degrees from universities and law schools without
being falsely taught that attempts to broaden distribution do not increase
the size of the pie but merely redistribute different portions of the same
sized pie, and worse yet, will tend to erode the incentives for making
more pie.77 But students have a right to know that the neoclassical
approach is not the only economic approach to distribution and growth.
Socioeconomics is open to other theories that hold that broader
distribution can have a positive impact on wealth maximization.
The interests of clients and students are not limited to the size of the
pie, the size of their slices, and the size of their slices in relation to the
slices of others. Clients have an interest in understanding (in the
complicated mix of private and public activity) how the pie is made and
how they might legitimately increase their participation not only in the
pie but also in the bakery.78
74. Aristarchus of Samos, in a remarkable insight, first proposed the sun-centred
solar system in the third century A.D. For Aristarchus’s work, see generally SIR THOMAS
HEATH, ARISTARCHUS OF SAMOS: THE ANCIENT COPERNICUS (1959). Galileo proposed
the geocentric alternative, was accused of heresy, and was forced to recant. The “facts”
of the geocentric paradigm were empirically verifiable and considered beyond dispute
for over fourteen hundred years. Some principles that were difficult to understand by
almost everyone in one era can be taught to grade school children in the next. Presently,
the concept of geocentrism is taught to grade school children.
75. Marc-André Pigeon & L. Randall Wray, Demand Constraints and the New
Economy, in A POST KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE ON 21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
158, 160–61, 180 (Paul Davidson ed., 2002).
76. Correlation does not establish causality. There is a strong correlation, for
example, between the numbers of people who carry umbrellas when leaving home and
the incidence of rain. The correlation is statistically significant and good enough for
much social science. Nevertheless, carrying umbrellas does not cause rain, but rather is
a consequence of the true causes for rain.
77. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 369–70.
78. Ashford, supra note 69, at 1576; Ashford, Binary Economics, supra note 67, at
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To this end, the socioeconomic approach calls for (1) an evenhanded
consideration of all the relevant economic and other theories—whether
or not they have been validated by a critical mass of economists, (2) an
identification and assessment of their underlying assumptions, and (3) an
analysis of how well the theories apply in context as well as they do in
idealized circumstances.
In the context of substantial unutilized productive capacity that
persists despite the guidance from classical, neoclassical, and Keynesian
economics, based on socioeconomic principles, and the concept of a
prima facie case, socioeconomics can provide the foundation for exploring
wealth-enhancing approaches at or beyond the margin of economics that
are conceptually distinct from the neoclassical, Keynesian, and other
approaches. Working in harmony with the process of legal inquiry, the
definition of socioeconomics can enable lawyers and law teachers to
provide a forum in which to give promising theories a paradigm-neutral
hearing that they have been denied by economists. For example, two
promising approaches to economics growth—the leakage theory of
Treval Powers and the binary economics of Louis Kelso—which have
been given little or no attention by economists, are especially worthy of
exploration.
With a modest investment of time, it is not difficult to enable law
students to appreciate the contribution that socioeconomics can make to
their legal education. Most students come to law school with a sense
that, in general, the difference in approaches and policies championed by
most people on the political left, right, and center, most democrats,
republicans, liberals, conservatives, libertarians, and socialists are significantly
connected to their understanding or misunderstanding of economic
issues. With the benefit of a socioeconomic education, when considering the
analysis, positions, and policies advanced by various people and institutions
in society regarding many law-related economic controversies, students
can come to understand that important differences in opinion regarding
law-related economic issues have deep roots in the neoclassical
economics paradigm, reactions to it, and other approaches offered to
complement, supplement, or replace it. And it is not difficult for them to
come to appreciate that, with a socioeconomic approach, teaching and
learning the law and pursuing ways to improve the law can proceed with
6 (pointing out that “[b]inary economics is an important legal issue because it presents an
alternative private property system structured to enable all people to acquire a viable
capital estate”).
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greater competence and candor.
The socioeconomic approach is essential to law teaching and practice
because it helps students, clients, lawyers, and teachers to identify and
secure essential rights and responsibilities. The socioeconomic approach
is important not only as a means of assisting lawyers in realizing better
ethics in legal representation; it may have even greater value in assisting
academics to realize better ethics in teaching, scholarship, and service
and in assisting students to understand the ethical obligations of their
teachers when teaching law-related economic issues.
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